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and contingency contracting is the process to employ them. Ten years of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the U.S. Army's major challenges in adequate planning, requirements determination, and contracting officer representative (COR) oversight. These contributed to contingency contracting waste equating to more than $8 million per day.
This strategic research paper (SRP) examines shortfalls in the focus on and training of non-acquisition personnel in their key responsibilities to plan and oversee contingency contracting. These shortcomings include proper planning, requirements determination, and management. 2 In that spirit, this Strategic Research Project focuses on contingency contracting from the non-acquisition community perspective. Increased workload and tempo affect the non-acquisition community with respect to the number of contracts and speed with which they are required to support the force. The challenge of complexity is one that particularly affects the non-acquisition community with respect to planning, requirements determination, and oversight, and will be the focus of the paper. 3 This paper discusses challenges for the non-acquisition community's responsibilities to the contingency contracting process. It will focus on the areas of planning for contracted services, preparing the requirements documents, and ensuring that selected contracting officer representatives (COR) are properly trained to provide 2 contract management duties. These three responsibilities are instrumental in the reduction of contract waste and risk, and maximum effective use of resources to complete the mission. These three specific tasks start the contingency contract process and are the primary responsibility of the non-acquisition community.
Contingency contracting, formerly known as expeditionary contracting, continued to receive attention from the highest levels of the military as well as the U.S. Congress based on reports of fraud, waste, and abuse. Over the last ten years of prolonged operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the media highlighted numerous examples of fraud, waste, and abuse, which led to Congressional investigations. 4 The billion and $60 billion. At the lowest estimate of $31 billion, the loss to the tax payer was greater than $8 million per day over the last ten years. 5 The August 2011 Commission Report also found that no less than two thirds of all contingency contracts were for services. 6 The number of service contracts required to support deployed forces is likely to remain around this level for the near term, based on the current and projected force structure of the U.S. Army. The complexity of service contracts is important because the expertise and manpower required to plan, generate requirements into a performance work statement, and properly manage service contracts are greater than those for the simple acquisition of goods. Also, service contracts generally provide services over a longer period of performance or time period. This statement speaks directly to the non-acquisition community, also referred to as the requiring activity. The leaders outside the acquisition community must prioritize planning and requirements determination in order to reverse some of the trends for wasteful contracts. 14 Planning for contingency contracting does not stop at the joint or combatant command level. Once an operation is ongoing, deployed units will encounter an evolving environment and mission changes that will drive the need for new or modified contracts. The paper will discuss the planning challenges at several command levels.
Greater detail in early planning from the joint planning level to tactical unit level will maximize contingency contract effectiveness and efficiency. Planning is just the first of five key tasks in the contract support integrated process followed by requirements determination, contract development, contract execution, and contract closeout. 15 The increased understanding of possible/probable contingency contracting issues/challenges gained through the planning process will directly impact the success or failure of the following four steps.
Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, describes the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX) and the associated functions and products under APEX.
There are four levels of planning detail for contingency plans. Two of the plan products, Level Three and Level Four Plans, require selected annexes to complete the plans.  Theater support contracts are contracts awarded by contracting officers in the operational area. Local national or third country national personnel make up the bulk of the contract employees in this type of contract. 20 The planners should easily address systems support contracts into their plans based on the systems that will deploy in support of the operation. These contracts should specify the government's obligations for contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF). If the system support contract lacks such specificity, planners will need to plan for this support. As technology and equipment systems change, periodic reviews of the system support contracts listed in the plan are essential to reduce the The toughest challenge for the planner will be theater support contracts. The number of variables with respect to this type of contract is large and complex. Some include the mission, location, duration, capability, resource availability, contractor capacities, and cost. Generally speaking, units will initiate these types of contracts because time and cost to procure supplies and services are quicker and better priced in theater than with external contracts from outside theater.
Commanders may also try to build capacity in an operational area through the use of local contractors. An increase in theater contracts requires an increase in the 11 number of contingency contracting officers and contracting officer representatives. The 2011 Wartime Commission Reports found that a lack of sufficient personnel to award and manage contingency contracts resulted in fraud, waste, and abuse. 21 An important aspect of a theater contract is the requiring unit's responsibility to determine the requirements.
The transition from an external contract to a theater contract will take time to plan and write. Depending on quantity and complexity of the requirement, the process can take anywhere from ninety days to well over a year. Moreover, this process will likely occur over two or more rotations of military personnel. The management of this process is critical as key personnel from the requiring unit and acquisition community rotate in and out of theater. Another potential issue is the tendency to change the requirement when personnel rotate.
Contingency contracting facts and issues must form part of the pre-deployment 
32
FORSCOM has not directed mandatory training in requirements determination for deploying units. 33 The lack of mandatory training on preparing well-written and defined requirements is a risk to effective and efficient contingency contracting. However, there exists voluntary training with respect to requirements generation listed in the Handbook for Developing a Performance Work Statement. These courses are the:
 Performance Work Statement Course, located at Fort Lee, Virginia, is a three-day course for officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians who will prepare or edit performance work statements.
 Operational Contract Support Course, located at Fort Lee, Virginia, is a two week course on contract planning and management duties to include developing a performance work statement in tactical unit staffs, brigade through theater Army, for deployed operations. In the years since then, GAO has continued to identify a need for DOD to better manage and oversee its acquisition of services. 37 The risk of waste associated with contingency contract management has not decreased. The GAO found during their 2010 visit to Afghanistan that units continue to deploy without designating CORs beforehand and that the representatives often lacked the technical knowledge and training to oversee contracts effectively. 38 
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Requiring activities are responsible to train their CORs prior to arrival in a theater.
The COR duties include, but are not limited to, periodic quality-assurance inspections, receipt of invoices, and submission of contractor invoices, along with a receiving report, to the financial management unit for contract payment. The FORSCOM pre-deployment guidance dated September 13, 2011 directs the specific unit requirements for COR training prior to deployment. 39 Given the task to provide contingency contract oversight, commanders must recommend a COR-trained Soldier to the contracting officer for approval on each contract. Once the contracting officer places the COR on orders, the Soldier is now responsible to the contracting officer for effective contract management. The process appears simple; it is not. The commander must balance other unit priorities when choosing the correct Soldier.
Unlike planning and requirements generation functions, the U.S. Army and acquisition community have instituted Commission recommendations to train CORs.
The U.S. Army provides COR training and directs a required number of COR-trained Soldiers per unit prior to deployment. 40 The acquisition community in some cases has provided additional in-theater training for approved contracting officer representatives, which provides country-specific contract details with respect to contract management and reporting. 
Conclusion
The findings of several Congressional Commissions and GAO reports on contingency contracting identified shortcomings in planning, requirements determination, and management. These shortfalls resulted in losses amounting to more than $8 million a day over the last ten years. 44 Such a loss is too high a price. DOD and the U.S. Army can remedy the shortcomings through doctrinal changes and education. 
